- Solve
Kleinberg and Tardos, Chapter 1, Exercise 1. (5pts)
- Solve
Kleinberg and Tardos, Chapter 1, Exercise 2. (5pts)
-
Determine whether the following
statement is true or false. If it is true, give an example. If it is
false, give a short explanation. (5pts)
For some
n ≥
2, there exists a set of
preferences for n
men and n
women such that in the stable matching returned by the G-S algorithm
when men are proposing, every woman is matched with their most
preferred man, even though that man does not prefer that woman the
most.
-
A stable roommate problem with
4 students
a,
b,
c,
d
is defined as follows. Each student ranks the other three in strict
order of preference. A matching is defined as the partition of the
students into two groups of two roommates. A matching is stable if
no two separated students prefer each other to their current
roommate.
Does a stable matching always exist?
If yes, give a proof. Otherwise, give an example of roommate
preferences where no stable matching exists. (8pts)
- Solve
Kleinberg and Tardos, Chapter 1, Exercise 4. (15pts)
- Solve
Kleinberg and Tardos, Chapter 1, Exercise 8. (10pts)
-
Determine whether the following
statement is true or false. If it is true, give a short explanation.
If it is false, give a counterexample.
For all
n ≥
2, there exists a set of
preferences for n
men and n
women such that in the stable matching returned by the G-S algorithm
when men are proposing, every man is matched with their most
preferred woman.
- Consider
a stable marriage problem where the set of men is given by
M
= m1,
m2,
..., mN
and the set of women is W
= w1,
w2,
..., wN
. Consider their preference lists to have the following properties:
∀wi
∈ W
: wi
prefers mi
over mj ∀j
> i
∀mi
∈ M
: mi
prefers wi
over wj ∀j
> i
Prove that a unique stable matching
exists for this problem. Note: the
∀
symbol means “for all”. (12pts)
UNGRADED
PRACTICE PROBLEMS
-
Determine whether the following
statement is true or false. If it is true, give a short explanation.
If it is false, give a counterexample.
For all
n ≥
2, there exists a set of
preferences for n
men and n
women such that in the stable matching returned by the G-S algorithm
when men are proposing, every woman is matched with their least
preferred man.
- Consider
the Gale-Shapley algorithm operating on
n
men and n
women, with women proposing.
-
What is the maximum number of times
a woman may be rejected, with respect to the problem size
n?
Give an example where this can happen.
-
Consider the following modification
to the G-S algorithm: at each iteration, we always pick the free
woman with the highest average preference among men, i.e. the most
“popular” remaining woman (when taking an average across all
men’s preference lists). Prove or disprove: this will help reduce
the number of rejections for some women.